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Comments
AMENDMENTS TO PLEADINGS AFTER THE
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS HAS RUN - A CHANGE
IN MISSOURI
I. INTRODUCTION
On September 1, 1973, new rule 55.33(c) of the Missouri Rules
of Civil Procedure became effective. The rule, which now governs
the relation back of amended pleadings, provides:
Whenever the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading
arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or
attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the amendment
relates back to the date of the original pleading. An amendment
changing the party against whom a claim is asserted relates back
if the foregoing provision is satisfied and within the period pro-
vided by law for commencing the action against him, the party to
be brought in by amendment (1) has received such notice of the
institution of the action that he will not be prejudiced in maintain-
ing his defense on the merits, and (2) knew or should have known
that, but for a mistake concerning the identity of the proper party,
the action would have been brought against him.'
The adoption of the new rule, which duplicates the language of rule
15(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, should result in signifi-
cant changes in the circumstances under which pleadings amended
after the applicable statute of limitations has run will be deemed
to relate -back to the date of the original pleading.
Before rule 55.33(c) was adopted, Missouri law on relation
back of amendments was based upon a "cause of action" test. Under
this test, amendments to the original pleading, made after the run-
ning of the statute, would be allowed if the amendments related to
the same cause of action as asserted in the original pleading.2
Amendments which were deemed to state a new and distinct cause
of action would not relate back to the date of the original pleading
and were thereby barred by the statute of limitations.3 The inade-
1. Mo. R. Civ. P. 55.33(c).
2. Miller v. Werner, 431 S.W.2d 116 (Mo. 1968). The court indicated that "where an
original petition is merely defective and is made good by amendment, after the running of
the limitation period, the statute is held not to apply." Id. at 118.
3. Id.
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quacies of this theory became apparent when courts had to deter-
mine what constitutes a new cause of action. Various courts have
utilized five basic tests when making that determination: (1)
whether a judgment upon the claim set forth in either pleading
would bar an independent action on the other; (2) whether the same
evidence supports both the original and amended pleading; (3)
whether the measure of damages is the same in each case; (4)
whether the new allegation would deprive the other party of some
substantive defense available under the earlier pleading; and (5)
whether the same burden of proof would be required under the
original and amended petitions. 4 The Missouri courts adopted the
"evidence", "proof" and "damages" test to determine which
amendments were barred by the statute of limitations.' Thus, the
determination of whether an amendment would relate back to the
date of the original pleading was based upon technical considera-
tions, without regard to whether notice was actually communicated
to the defendant of the factual situation upon which the cause of
action was based.
In contrast to the "cause of action" test, the federal courts and
other jurisdictions which have adopted the federal rule have used a
different test. In Jackson v. Airways Parking Co.,' a federal district
court spoke of the manner in which federal rule 15(c) is usually
applied:
Many decisions have held that if the amended complaint pre-
sented a new cause of action, it could not relate back to the date
of the original pleading for statute of limitations purposes....
The point of rule 15(c) is that it is fair to have an amended com-
plaint relate back if the initial complaint put the defendant on
notice that a certain range of matters was in controversy and the
amended complaint falls within that range. The "cause of action"
doctrine is an unduly restrictive interpretation of rule 15(c). It does
not do justice to the actual statutory language. Notice, not me-
4. C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1497 (1971).
5. Laux v. Motor Carriers Council, 499 S.W.2d 805 (Mo. 1973); Miller v. Werner, 431
S.W.2d 116 (Mo. 1968); Coleman v. Ziegler, 248 S.W.2d 610 (Mo. 1952); Mitchell v. Health
Culture Co., 349 Mo. 475, 162 S.W.2d 233 (1942); Arpe v. Mesker Bros. Iron Co., 323 Mo.
640, 19 S.W.2d 668 (1929). But see Miller v. Munzer, 251 S.W.2d 966 (St. L. Mo. App. 1952),
where in a will contest action, an amendment introducing a new ground of contest did not
state a new cause of action even though new evidence would be required to prove it, since a
will contest is deemed to be only one cause of action.
6. 297 F. Supp. 1366 (N.D. Ga. 1969).
[Vol. 40
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chanical notions of cause of action for res judicata purposes is the
key. 7
The rationale espoused by courts applying the rule is that once the
defendant has been notified of the facts upon which a claim is
based, the defendant is able to prepare a defense to any claim which
may arise from that factual situation.' In that respect the "notice"
approach justified under the language of federal rule 15(c) is
clearly more liberal in allowing amendments to pleadings than was
the "cause of action" test formerly used in Missouri.
This comment will compare the treatment of typical factual
situations under the notice and cause of action tests, concentrating
on two main areas: the addition of factual material to pleadings and
the addition of parties to the lawsuit after the statute of limitations
has run. The general topic of additions of factual material will in-
clude such amendments as correction of defective pleadings, ampli-
fication of pleadings, changes in legal theories upon which relief is
sought, and the addition of different claims to those set forth in the
original petition. The second broad area, additions of parties, will
cover such problems as the addition of parties plaintiff, addition of
new defendants, notice requirements for the addition of corporate
and noncorporate defendants, and the identity of interest require-
ment for the addition of new defendants.
11. TREATMENT OF SUPPLEMENTARY FACTUAL MATERIAL
A. Amendments to Defective Pleadings
The first type of situation to be considered arises where the
original pleading failed to state sufficient facts to form a basis of
7. Id. at 1382 (emphasis added). Accord, Barthel v. Stamm, 145 F.2d 487 (5th Cir.
1944), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 878 (1945). But see Popovitch v. Kasperlik, 76 F. Supp. 233
(W.D. Pa. 1947), where the court based its decision on a "cause of action" test, but defined
"cause of action" as the specified conduct of the defendant upon which the plaintiff tries to
enforce his claim. Id. at 238.
8. Snoqualmie Tribe of Indians v. United States, 372 F.2d 951 (Ct. Cl. 1967). In
Snoqualmie the court stated:
[The rule] is based on the idea that a party who is notified of litigation concerning
a given transaction or occurence is entitled to no more protection from statutes of
limitations than one who is informed of the precise legal description of the rights
sought to be enforced. . . . [Thus notice is the test, and it is built into the rule's
requirement that the amended pleading arise out of the same "conduct, transac-
tion, or occurrence." In other words, the inquiry in a determination of whether a
claim should relate back will focus on the notice given by the general fact situation




Marlow: Marlow: Amendments to Pleadings
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1975
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
recovery for damages. Neither the notice nor cause of action test
would allow an amendment to sustain recovery where the statute of
limitations had run at the time the original petition was filed For
example, in Jackson v. Ideal Publishing Corp., an action for inva-
sion of privacy, plaintiff filed her original complaint on January 19,
1966, 10 days after the statute of limitations for such claims had
run. In an attempt to save her action, the plaintiff tried to amend
her original petition to include two more publications occuring in
March and April of 1964, which were within the statutory period if
the amendment were allowed. The court disallowed the amend-
ments and dismissed the suit. The statute of limitations had run on
the two latter publications by the date of the amendment, and the
two latter publications, being separate and distinct, did not relate
to the same transaction or occurence.
Where the original petition is timely and states sufficient facts
to notify the defendant of the nature of the suit but fails to state
sufficient facts for recovery, and the correcting amendment is filed
after the statute would otherwise have run, the notice test courts
and the cause of action test courts differ. The federal courts allow
the amendment to correct the deficiency while the cause of action
courts usually do not." For example, in United States v. Somers
Construction Co.,12 the plaintiff brought an action in federal court
under the Miller Act for work performed by it under contract, but
failed to specify in the complaint what work had been done or what
materials had been furnished. Both allegations were prerequisites to
recovery under the Miller Act. After the limitation period had
elapsed, the plaintiff attempted to correct the deficiencies by
amending its complaint to specify what labor had been performed
and what materials had been supplied. In allowing this amendment,
the court observed that "the complaint gave the defendants fair
warning that suit was being brought against them under the Miller
Act, and the amendment does nothing more than particularize the
general allegations set forth in the complaint. ' '13
Likewise, the failure to allege particular negligent acts on the
9. McCandish v. Estate of Timberlake, 497 S.W.2d 191 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1973).
10. 274 F. Supp. 318 (E.D. Pa. 1967). See Griggs v. Farmer, 430 F.2d 638 (4th Cir. 1970);
Wiren v. Paramount Pictures, 206 F.2d 465 (D.C. Cir 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 938 (1954);
Stafford v. Roadway Transit Co., 165 F.2d 920 (3rd Cir. 1948). But see Gretkowski v. Coppola,
26 Conn. Sup. 294, 222 A.2d 41 (1966); In re Miller's Estate, 229 Ore. 618, 368 P.2d 327 (1962).
11. Otto v. Kansas City Star Co., 368 S.W.2d 494 (Mo. 1963).
12. 184 F. Supp. 563 (D. Del. 1960).
13. Id. at 567.
[Vol. 40
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part of the defendant was not fatal in United States v. Johnson."
The plaintiff brought an action under the Federal Tort Claims Act
for negligence on the part of the United States Air Force, but failed
to allege the occurence of any specific crash or instances of illegally
low flying or that the United States was negligent with respect to
any crash of its planes. After the statute had run the plaintiff was
allowed to amend her complaint to describe seven crashes of aircraft
on routine missions from Foster Air Force Base. 5
The federal courts have also allowed amendments to defective
complaints even though the statute under which relief is sought has
been repealed. In Junso Fujii v. Dulles,6 where the plaintiff sought
to be declared a citizen of the United States, the original complaint
failed to allege that the plaintiff had been denied registration as a
citizen of the United States. The plaintiff's amended petition sup-
plied that missing allegation, but it was filed after the statute of
limitations had run. The court nevertheless allowed the amend-
ment, even though the statute under which Fujii was proceeding
had in the interim been repealed.17
However, one state court, applying a relation back rule similar
to federal rule 15(c), adopted the position that a defective pleading
which fails to state a cause of action does not toll the running of the
statute of limitations. 8 Consequently, an amendment correcting the
deficiency after the statutory period had passed would not save the
action.
The essence of the approach of notice courts when dealing with
amendments or supplements of deficient pleadings is that "an
amended pleading relates back to the original pleading if a 'claim
for relief' was made or attempted within the statutory period."1 9
That test is broad enough to apply equally to second amendments
which amend or add to facts alleged as a basis of recovery raised for
the first time in the first amendment to the original petition, so long
14. 288 F.2d 40 (5th Cir. 1961).
15. Id. at 41; accord, Eberts Cadillac Co. v. Miller, 10 Mich. App. 270, 159 N.W.2d 217
(1968).
16. 224 F.2d 906 (9th Cir. 1955).
17. Id.
18. Lund v. Trojanski, 29 Conn. Sup. 69, 271 A.2d 123 (1970). The court in Lund
considered the original complaint a nullity, since it failed to state a claim either at common
law or under the Connecticut dogbite statute, and was, therefore, insufficient to toll the
statute of limitations.
19. Brito v. Carpenter, 81 N.M. 716, 472 P.2d 979, 981 (1970). See Wirtz v. Atkins, 247
F. Supp. 503 (E.D. Va. 1965); United States v. Somers Constr. Co., 184 F. Supp. 563 (D. Del.
1960); Field v. United States, 158 F. Supp. 580 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 926 (1958).
1975]
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as the first amended petition had been filed before the statute of
limitations had run against recovery upon that transaction. Thus,
in Hoffman v. A. B. Chance Co.,2o the plaintiffs original complaint
did not contain any claim of strict liability based on the alleged
defectiveness of a truck and aerial platform. Within the limitations
period the plaintiff amended his complaint to include such a claim.
The court allowed a second amendment adding related facts be-
cause the defendant received notice of the strict liability claim
within the statutory period.2
B. Amplification of the Original Pleading
The second typical pattern whereby supplementary factual
material is sought to be added to pleadings occurs when an amend-
ment would only "amplify" the original cause of action, rather than
correct deficient pleadings. In such situations it is assumed that the
original complaint did state a cause of action. Under both the old
Missouri rule and the notice test, merely changing the date desig-
nated in the pleadings on which a specified event or events was
alleged to have occurred will not keep an amendment from relating
back to the date of the original pleading. Thus, amendments chang-
ing the dates upon which various occurrences supposedly took
place, 2 such as an alleged preferential transfer,23 the performance
of certain personal services24 or a layoff from work,25 have been al-
lowed by both notice and cause of action courts, even though the
statute had run since the original pleadings were filed.
Federal courts will also typically allow the specified residence
of the plaintiff to be changed to establish diversity of citizenship for
federal jurisdictional purposes. In O'Shatz v. Bailey," the original
complaint alleged that plaintiff was a New York citizen residing in
20. 346 F. Supp. 991 (M.D. Pa. 1972).
21. See Halberstadt v. Harris Trust & Sav. Bank, 7 Il1. App. 3d 991, 289 N.E.2d 90
(1972), affd, 55 1ll.2d 121, 302 N.E.2d 64 (1973) (amendment asserting second count after
statute had run held effective against two defendants who had been added by amendment
before statute had run).
22. See Kimbro v. U.S. Rubber Co., 22 F.R.D. 309 (D. Conn. 1958), in which the
plaintiff amended his complaint to allege defendant's negligence continuing to the date of
an automobile accident through his representations that a tire was blowout-proof. Accord,
Bregar v. Suggett, 7 111. App. 3d 325, 287 N.E.2d 162 (1972), in which the plaintiff was allowed
to amend his petition to change the date on which a false arrest and malicious prosecution
allegedly took place.
23, In re Ostrer, 216 F. Supp. 133 (E.D.N.Y. 1963).
24. Weston v. Acme Tool, Inc., 449 P.2d 887 (Okla. 1969).
25. Wilson v. Ex-Cell-O Corp., 12 Mich. App. 637, 163 N.W.2d 492 (1968).
26. 220 F. Supp. 444 (D. Md. 1963).
[Vol. 40
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Washington, D.C.; the amended complaint changed the plaintiff's
specified citizenship to Washington, D.C. The court approved the
amendment, filed for the purpose of creating diversity of citizen-
ship. Plaintiffs in International Ladies' Garment Workers Union v.
Donnelly Garment Co.,27 similarly attempted to establish diversity
of citizenship by amending their original complaint. In allowing the
amendment the court stated that "such an amendment. . would
be permissible even after judgment if the amendment did not result
in eliminating indispensable parties defendant. '28
Amendments changing the alleged residence of a party are ac-
corded the same liberal treatment where the defendant wishes to
establish diversity of citizenship in order to remove the case from
the state court to a federal court. In Handy v. Uniroyal, Inc.29 the
defendant had failed in its removal petition to allege the principal
place of business of either party, as it was required to do for the
federal court to obtain diversity jurisdiction. The defendant's
amended petition which added that missing element was granted
and held to relate back to the time of filing of the original petition
for removal.
Similarly, the addition of an acknowledgement missing in the
original petition is allowed. In Tehansky v. Wilson" the plaintiff
failed to include an acknowledgement of the pleading in proper
person and the court allowed an amendment to correct this defi-
ciency.
In both notice and cause of action jurisdictions an amendment
in which the plaintiff asks for a greater amount of compensatory
damages will relate back to the date of the original complaint."'
Where the same negligent act or other occurrence is relied upon as
a basis of recovery, the plaintiff may also amend the complaint to
change the theory of damages in addition to increasing the amount
of damages. For instance, in Denver & Rio Grande Western R.R. v.
Clint,2 the plaintiff initially brought a wrongful death action under
a Colorado statute which authorized the recovery of only penal dam-
ages against a railroad for the negligence of its employees, up to a
27. 121 F.2d 561 (8th Cir. 1941).
28. Id. at 563 (dictum).
29. 298 F. Supp. 301 (D. Del. 1969); accord, Meyers-Arnold Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co.,
248 F. Supp. 140 (D.S.O. 1965).
30. 83 Nev. 263, 428 P.2d 375 (1967).
31. William T. Burton, Inc. v. Reed Roller Bit Co., 214 F. Supp. 84 (W.D. La. 1963);
Kansas v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 426 S.W.2d 720 (K.C. Mo. App. 1968).
32. 235 F.2d 445 (10th Cir. 1956).
1975]
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maximum of ten thousand dollars. After the two-year limitation
period had run, the plaintiff amended her complaint to assert a
claim under another statute which allowed recovery of compensa-
tory damages for wrongful death. Since the amendment dealt with
the same transaction as the original complaint, it was deemed to
relate back to the filing of that original complaint so as not to be
barred.
Where the purpose of an amendment is to change the measure
of damages from that claimed in the initial petition, however, state
courts which are bound by the cause of action test are much less
likely to permit the amendment to relate back if the statute has run
since the original claim was filed. Missouri courts applying the old
test33 held a change in the measure of damages sought to be a change
in the cause of action. 4 The plaintiff's original complaint in
Mitchell v. Health Culture Co.,15 was based upon the nonpayment
of a promissory note. The measure of damages for that claim would
have been the face value of the note plus interest. The plaintiff
sought to amend his original complaint to seek a recovery solely on
the basis of an alleged wrongful diversion of corporate income, for
which the measure of damages might not have equalled the amount
recoverable under the original count. Therefore, the amendment
was rejected because it stated a different cause of action and was
filed after the statute of limitations had run.
Courts in notice jurisdictions do not appear so restrictive in'the
face of such amendments. Federal courts will permit a plaintiff to
amend his complaint to add claims for puntitive damages in addi-
tion to the compensatory damages originally sought. In Scalise v.
Beech Aircraft Corp. ,36 the plaintiff first sued for compensatory
damages for the death of her husband in an aviation mishap. The
action was based upon breach of warranty, defect in construction or
design of the aircraft, and failure to issue adequate instruction for
the use of the aircraft. After the statute of limitations had run, the
plaintiff was allowed to amend her original complaint to add an
allegation of willful and wanton misconduct by the defendants to
increase her demand to include $500,000 for punitive damages in
addition to the compensatory damages initially prayed for. The
court looked only to whether the claim asserted in the amendment
33. See notes 4-5 and accompanying text supra.
34. Mitchell v. Health Culture Co., 349 Mo. 475, 162 S.W.2d 233 (1942).
35. Id.
36. 47 F.R.D. 148 (D. Del. 1969).
[Vol. 40
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arose out of the same conduct, transaction, or occurrence as set forth
in the original complaint."
A final situation in which federal courts treat amendments as
merely "amplifying" the original cause of action is where the
amendment states more facts which give greater specificity to the
action charged. For example, in Davis v. Yellow Cab Co.,3 the
plaintiff alleged in her original complaint that the cabdriver was
negligent in remaining seated in the driver's seat without exercising
any effort to assist the plaintiff and her companions in retiring from
defendant's cab or to help her in reentering it." In the amended
complaint, which was held only to make the allegation more spe-
cific, the plaintiff alleged that "while defendant's taxicab arrived at
the intersection of 12th and Market Streets, the driver carelessly
and negligently permitted the cab to move forward with plaintiff's
foot partially in the door," and charged the driver with negligence
in failing to operate the cab in a safe manner, in breaching the
standard of care owed to the public, and in permitting the cab to
move forward while its doors were open. Again, since the additional
facts were still part of the same occurrence as described in the
original pleading, the amendment related back.4"
C. Change in Legal Theories
The third common category of amendments to pleadings in-
volves attempts by plaintiffs to change the legal theory upon which
they wish to base a recovery. Under the prior Missouri law a change
in the legal theory would represent a change in the cause of action
because different evidence would be needed to prove the new theory
37. Id. at 152; see Cavanagh v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 183 F. Supp. 370 (W.D. Pa.
1960), where the court stated:
It is undoubtedly true that Pennsylvania authority [which follows a cause of action
test] treats an allegation of willful and wanton misconduct as creating a new basis
of action distinct and apart from an allegation of negligence . . . . The liberality
of the Federal Rules, however, invokes the notice pleading concept which would
entitle the plaintiff to all damages flowing from the occurrence out of which the
action arose ....
Id. at 371; cf. Cohen v. Garland, 119 Ga. App. 333, 167 S.E.2d 599 (1969); Krieger v. Village
of Carpentersville, 8 Ill. App. 3d 243, 289 N.E.2d 481 (1972).
38. 35 F.R.D. 159 (E.D. Pa. 1964).
39. Id. at 160.
40. Id. See also Blair v. Durham, 134 F.2d 729 (6th Cir. 1943); Williams v. Shipping
Corp. of India, 354 F. Supp. 626 (S.D. Ga. 1973) (petition amended to further describe man-
ner in which injuries occurred); Carroll v. Sterling Hotel Co., 16 F.R.D. 99 (M.D. Pa. 1954);
LaBar v. Cooper, 376 Mich. 401, 137 N.W.2d 136 (1965). Cf. Ford v. American Brake Shoe
Co., 252 S.W.2d 649 (St. L. Mo. App. 1952) (illustrating prior Missouri law).
1975]
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of recovery.4 Therefore, an amendment would not relate back to the
original petition if it were an attempt to change the legal theory
upon which recovery was based.4 2 The notice courts will, on the
other hand, allow an amendment to relate back where the amend-
ment changes the legal theory for recovery, so long as the new theory
is still based on the same transaction. 3 Thus, in Bradbury v.
Dennis,44 the plaintiff was allowed to amend his complaint, after the
statute of limitations had run, in order to base recovery upon a
money had and received theory instead of the statutory remedy for
recovery of usurious interest relied upon in the original complaint.
The notice courts also allow a plaintiff to add a different theory
of recovery to his original complaint if it is against the same defen-
dant.45 In Clary v. Nivens,4" the plaintiff instituted an action seeking
damages for false arrest. After the statute of limitations had run the
plaintiff was allowed to add the theory of malicious prosecution,
since the same general occurrence underlay both theories. The gen-
eral approach of notice courts to the addition of theories by amend-
ment is exemplified in Zagurski v. American Tobacco Co.,47 in
which the court stated:
The defendant has had notice from the beginning that the plaintiff
is trying to enforce a claim for damages sustained from smoking
the cigarettes it manufactured and marketed. It is not unreason-
able to require it to anticipate all theories of recovery and prepare
its defense accordingly. 48
D. Addition of Different Claims
Closely associated with the addition of another legal theory is
the addition of different claims which are related to the original
41. McDaniel v. Lovelace, 439 S.W.2d 906 (Mo.1969).
42. Miller v. Werner, 431 S.W.2d 116 (Mo. 1968). Accord, Swartz v. Bly, 183 N.W.2d
733 (Ia. 1971).
43. See Bradbury v. Dennis, 368 F.2d 905 (10th Cir. 1966); Wall v. Chesapeake & 0.
Ry., 339 F.2d 435 (4th Cir. 1964); C. Corkin & Sons, Inc. v. Tide Water Ass'd Oil Co., 20
F.R.D. 402 (D. Mass. 1957); Tri-Part Mfg. Co. v. Michigan Consol. Gas Co., 1 Mich. App.
684, 137 N.W.2d 739 (1965).
44. 368 F.2d 905 (10th Cir. 1966).
45. See Hood v. P. Ballantine & Sons, 38 F.R.D. 502 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); Flaherty v.
United Eng'rs & Constructors, Inc., 213 F. Supp. 835 (E.D. Pa. 1961); Gabaree v. Jay Ship
Maintenance Corp., 166 F. Supp. 625 (E.D. Pa. 1958); Sikes Co. v. Swift & Co., 10 F.R.D.
68 (W.D.N.Y. 1949); Kohler v. Ford Motor Co., 187 Neb. 428, 191 N.W.2d 601 (1971); Briggs
v. Merrell, 27 Conn. Sup. 60, 229 A.2d 550 (1966).
46. 12 N.C. App. 690, 184 S.E.2d 374 (1971).
47. 44 F.R.D. 440 (D. Conn. 1967).
48. Id. at 443.
[Vol. 40
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claim. On this point there has been a split of authority in the notice
courts but the differences of treatment seem largely dependent upon
the facts in each case. In one case, Green v. Wolf Corp.,49 the initial
claim was based on an alleged violation of the Securities Exchange
Act; after the statute of limitations had run, the court allowed an
amendment which alleged that the corporation paid its shareholders
a cash distribution which inflated the price of the stock and oper-
ated as a fraud on the subsequent purchasers. However, in Artman
v. International Harvester,"0 the court denied an amendment which
sought to add a claim for violation of the Sherman Act to the origi-
nal complaint based on a breach of contract. The court found that
the original complaint dealt with the issue of a bad faith breach of
contract by the defendant in terminating the plaintiff as a dealer
of its products and only brought into issue the dealings between the
parties. The proposed amendment, alleging a Sherman Act viola-
tion, put in issue the dealings and marketing practices of the defen-
dant and other dealers of its products. Since the two claims dealt
with different factual situations, the court held that granting the
amendment would prejudice the defendant in its ability to defend
against the action. 51
III. TREATMENT OF ADDrIONS OF PARTIES5
2
The second general area of concern with rule 55.33(c),53 after its
effect on supplementary factual material, is with the relation back
of amendments to pleadings which attempt to add or change parties
to the lawsuit. 4 Two obvious categories of factual situations arise
49. 50 F.R.D. 220 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
50. 355 F. Supp. 476 (W.D. Pa. 1972).
51. Compare Coleman v. Ziegler, 248 S.W.2d 610 (Mo. 1952).
52. See generally Annot., 11 A.L.R. Fed. 269(1972).
53. See rule quoted at pt. I of this comment.
54. In 1966, FED. R. Civ. P. 15(c) was amended by the addition of the concluding
sentence, which states the rule to be applied when parties to a lawsuit are sought to be
changed.
Rule 15(c) is amplified to state more clearly when an amendment of a pleading
changing the party against whom a claim is asserted shall "relate back" to the date
of the original pleading.
In actions between private parties, the problem of relation back of amendments
changing defendants has generally been better handled by the courts, but incorrect
criteria have sometimes been applied, leading sporadically to doubtful results. ...
Rule 15(c) has been amplified to provide a general solution.
FED. R. Civ. P. 15(c), Committee Comments to 1966 Amendments. As the court in Traveler's
Indem. Co. v. United States, 382 F.2d 103, 106 (10th Cir. 1967), stated: "The 1966
1975]
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under this topic. Amendments of this type must add either parties
plaintiff or defendant. The remainder of this comment will discuss
the more common factual variations on the theme, and their proba-
ble treatment under the new notice rule.
A. Additions of Parties Plaintiff
The addition by amendment of plaintiffs in the notice courts
does not present a major problem since the defendant has already
received notice of the factual situation upon which relief is sought.
Consequently, in cases where the plaintiff wishes to bring a second
cause of action, but in a different representative capacity, the
amendment to the original complaint has typically been allowed in
the federal courts. The rationale given is that the defendant already
knows the facts upon which the plaintiff's suit is brought.
Snoqualmie Tribe of Indians v. United States55 offers an example of
such an amendment. Because the plaintiff Snoqualmie Tribe had
merged through intermarriage with the Skykomish Tribe, the plain-
tiff was permitted to amend its pleadings to include the other tribe's
claim for compensation for territory ceded to the United States in
the 1800's.
Amendments adding new plaintiffs on the same claim have
been allowed in situations where the defendant had notice that
those plaintiffs could bring actions of their own. Thus, where neces-
sary to save his own action, one partner may make his other partners
parties plaintiff through the use of an amendment after the statute
of limitations has run. In De Franco v. United States," a partner
suing for a refund of taxes paid by the partnership was allowed to
bring in the other partners as parties plaintiff, since they were essen-
tial to the action and the government had full notice that the suit
was for the recovery of taxes paid by the partnership.
The joinder of a personal representative when required for re-
covery under a statute is also permissible. A widow, in Holmes v.
Pennsylvania New York Central Transportation Co. ,57 was allowed
to amend her petition to add the personal representative of the
decedent, whose joinder was necessary for recovery under the Indi-
ana wrongful death statute. Conversely, where the statute used for
amendment simply clarifies, by explicitly stating the permissive procedure and its appropri-
ate safeguards which have existed under Rule 15(c) since its promulgation."
55. 372 F.2d 951 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
56. 18 F.R.D. 156 (S.D. Cal. 1955).
57. 48 F.R.D. 449 (N.D. Ind. 1969).
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the basis of a suit calls for a "person aggrieved" to bring suit, an
executor of an estate may amend his petition to substitute the lega-
tee as a party plaintiff. This was done in National Bank v. District
of Columbia," in which the executor bank instituted suit to contest
the valuation of shares of stock for inheritance tax purposes. When
the executor appealed the decision of the tax court it lacked stand-
ing under the statute to challenge the assessment. But inasmuch as
the executor had acted from the beginning for the legatee's benefit,
the court held that she could be substituted as party plaintiff for
review of the assessment. The court did not find direct guidance in
its existing rule for substitution, but held the substitution to relate
back to the original date of filing because of the "power of equity to
grant relief against injustice caused by the rigidity of procedure
" 59
The allowance of amendments substituting plaintiffs also ap-
plies to situations in which the statute has run against certain types
of parties but not against others. In Crowder v. Gordons Transports,
Inc. ,6 a widow brought a wrongful death action in her capacity as
the administratrix of her husband's estate. It was later determined
that the statute of limitations had run on an action by the adminis-
tratrix, but not on a suit by the children of the deceased. Therefore,
the widow sought to amend her petition to substitute herself as
mother and next friend of the two children of the deceased. The
court granted the amendment and held it to relate back to the date
of filing the original complaint, even though when the amendment
was filed the statute of limitations had also run for wrongful death
actions brought by the children of the deceased. The amendment
related back because the original complaint had advised the defen-
dant that the relief sought by the widow was for the benefit of the
two children of the deceased; the defendant was not prejudiced by
the failure to name the mother as next friend rather than as admin-
istratrix.8 1
Similarly, an insurance company which has been subrogated to
the claim of an insured may be added as a plaintiff in a suit to
recover for the partial loss of property. The court of appeals, in
Kansas Electric Power Co. v. Janis,2 upheld the allowance of an
58. 226 F.2d 763 (D.C.1955).
59. Id. at 764; see American Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. All American Bus Lines, Inc., 190
F.2d 234 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 851 (1951).
60. 387 F.2d 413 (8th Cir. 1967).
61. Id. at 419.
62. 194 F.2d 942 (10th Cir. 1952).
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amendment adding two insurance companies as parties plaintiff
after the statute of limitations had run, where the companies were
real parties in interest, having been subrogated to the insureds who
instituted the action. The court reasoned that the defendant was not
prejudiced, because the cause of action and the relief demanded
remained the same. 63 Logically, many amendments of this type
would be accepted in both notice and cause of action jurisdictions,
where the only defect is that the wrong party brought the action and
the defendant is aware of the existence of the real party in interest.64
B. Addition of Parties Defendant
The last major factual pattern arising under the rule involves
the addition or substitution of defendants. In order for an amend-
ment adding new defendants to be allowed, there must be such
identity of interest between the old defendants and the new defen-
dant that the new defendant had notice of the suit and should have
known that except for a mistake he would have been the original
defendant.65
1. Requisite Identity of Interest and Notice in Corporate
Relationships
One common situation in which the requisite identity of inter-
est has been found is where a parent-subsidiary corporate relation-
ship exists between the old and the new defendants. In Travelers
Indemnity Co. v. United States,6 the plaintiff materialman filed a
suit to recover under a payment bond. An amendment was allowed
which changed the defendant from the Travelers Insurance Com-
pany to the Travelers Indemnity Company, a wholly owned subsi-
diary. The requisite identity of interest was found by the court from
the fact that both companies did business in Colorado, shared the
63. Id. at 944. There is some authority for the proposition that the notice theory would
allow a new plaintiff with a different claim to be substituted for the original plaintiff. See
Williams v. United States, 405 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1968). But see Higgins, Inc. v. Kiekhaeffer
Corp. 246 F. Supp. 610 (E.D. Wis. 1965).
64. See Link Aviation, Inc. v. Downs, 325 F.2d 613 (D.C. Cir. 1963); American Fidelity
& Cas. Co. v. All American Bus Lines, Inc., 190 F.2d 234 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S.
851 (1951). In Downs, the court allowed substitution of the insurance company after the
statute had run on the theory that the insureds had brought the suit as nominal plaintiffs
for the use of the insurer with subrogation rights. The American Fidelity case also allowed
subtitution of the excess insurer which was subrogated to the insured plaintiff's rights against
the primary insurer.
65. Mo. R. CiV. P. 55.13(c); FED. R. Civ. P. 15(c).
66. 382 F.2d 103 (10th Cir. 1967).
[Vol. 40
14
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 40, Iss. 3 [1975], Art. 4
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol40/iss3/4
AMENDMENTS TO PLEADINGS
same home office address and board of directors, and supplemented
each other's activities. The facts established that "the [Indemnity
Company] was the entity intended to be before the court and that
the [Indemnity Company] was sufficiently apprised of the pen-
dency of the action and given adequate notice." 7
Service of process upon the parent corporation and the manager
of the subsidiary corporation has satisfied the identity of interst
requirements of the rule needed to have the subsidiary substituted
as the sole corporate defendant. In Wirtz v. Mercantile Stores,
Inc.," the court found the subsidiary store, Muskogee Jones, to have
received notice of the claim of the plaintiff, because its manager had
been served with a copy of the complaint naming its parent as the
defendant.69
The second common instance of sufficient identity of interest
at the corporate level has been that between a named corporate
defendant and its successor organization. It has frequently been
held that a successor corporation should have known that a mistake
had been made by the plaintiff if the plaintiff's complaint had been
served upon it. Where the successor is the only corporation regis-
tered under the name set out in the complaints, the plaintiff should
be granted leave to amend his pleadings to substitute the successor
corporation as defendant. Wentz v. Alberto-Culver Co.7" is illustra-
tive. The plaintiff's initial pleading named the Alberto-Culver Com-
pany, an Illinois corporation, as defendant. However, the Illinois
corporation had been dissolved in 1961 and its assets acquired by
the Alberto-Culver Company, a Delaware corporation. The court
allowed substitution of the latter corporation, since the words desig-
nating the state of incorporation were not a part of either name, at
67. Id. at 106.
68. 274 F. Supp. 1000 (E.D. Okla. 1967). Accord, Montalvo v. Tower Life Bldg., 426
F.2d 1135 (5th Cir. 1970).
69. But see Jacobs v. McCloskey & Co., 40 F.R.D. 486 (E.D. Pa. 1966), where substitu-
tion of a wholly owned subsidiary for the named corporate defendant was not allowed after
the lapse of the limitation period. The original complaint was served on the parent corpora-
tion, whose attorneys answered admitting the allegation that it owned a building involved in
the litigation; in fact, the subsidiary owned the building, and the parent was allowed to
amend its answer to deny ownership. In refusing plaintiff's attempt to substitute the subsidi-
ary as defendant, the court relied on its characterization of the corporate subsidiary as a
"distinct and separate entity" as reason not to bring it into the action after the statute had
run. The court gave no indication that it had considered whether the subsidiary had in fact
received notice of the claim and should have known that, but for mistake, it would have been
included. Id. at 489.
70. 294 F. Supp. 1327 (D. Mont. 1969). Accord, Shapiro v. Paramount Film Distrib.
Corp., 274 F.2d 743 (3rd Cir. 1960).
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the time the suit was filed only the Delaware corporation had the
name "Alberto-Culver Company," and the corporation had ac-
knowledged receipt of the original summons by signing that name.
An amendment which names the successor organization as the
new defendant will be allowed where it is the surviving corporation
after a corporate consolidation or reorganization. In Callahan v.
American Sugar Refining Co.,71 the plaintiff brought suit against the
American Sugar Refining Company, a New Jersey corporation
which owned the premises on which plaintiff's husband was injured.
Before suit was filed, that company had been acquired by Domino
Sugar Company, a Delaware corporation. Domino, in turn, had
changed its name to American Sugar Company, but remained a
Delaware corporation. In this instance the court allowed the amend-
ment substituting American Sugar of Delaware as defendant and
held it related back to the original complaint, because the interest
of the Delaware corporation were identical to those of the first
named defendant, the same events were involved, and it had had
full notice of the case and must have realized it would have been
named as defendant if plaintiff had been aware of the merger.12
The third area where a prospective corporate defendant has
been held to have a sufficient identity of interest to be added by
amendment after the running of the statute is in the brother-sister
corporate situation. In Marino v. Gotham Chalkboard Manufactur-
ing Corp.," the plaintiff moved to amend the pleadings to substitute
Gotham Chalkboard & Trim Co., Inc., as the sole defendant, in
place of the original defendant, Gotham Chalkboard Manufacturing
Corporation. Both concerns were small New York corporations with
identical organizers, officers, and directors. Because of that "ident-
ity of management and location," the court held that notice by
service of process on one corporation was equivalent to notice to the
other. The substituted party also should have known that but for
plaintiffs mistake it would have been named the original defen-
dant, because of the familiar facts and occurrences alleged in the
complaint and its knowledge that the other corporation had never
been active.74
71. 47 F.R.D. 359 (E.D.N.Y. 1969).
72. Id. at 361.
73. 259 F. Supp. 953 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). See Bernstein v. Uris Bldgs. Corp., 50 F.R.D.
121 (S.D.N,Y. 1970).
74. 259 F. Supp. at 954. Both notice and knowledge of mistake must be at least con-
structively present, however; the bare existence of a brother-sister relationship may not be
enough. See Martz v. Millers Bros. Co., 244 F. Supp. 246 (D. Del. 1965), where despite the
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2. Identity of Interest and Notice for Noncorporate Defendants
The same kinds of considerations are present when an attempt
is made to add or substitute a noncorporate entity as defendant in
pending litigation. If the prospective defendant is not to be preju-
diced by his late joinder, he must have had notice of the action and
such an identity of interest with the original defendant that he knew
that he would have been made a party had the plaintiff not been
mistaken about his identity.
Where suit is brought against an unincorporated business iden-
tified in the pleadings by its trade name, it is typical of courts to
deem the sole proprietor of that business to have both the requisite
notice of suit and identity of interest so not to be prejudiced by his
addition as an individual defendant. In Wynne v. United States ex.
rel. Mid-States Waterproofing Co.,Ts the plaintiff subcontractor, in
a contract action against the primary contractor pursuant to the
Miller Act, described the original defendant as "the Bering Com-
pany." After the statute of limitations had run the subcontractor
was allowed to amend his complaint to show that J. C. Wynne, "a
sole proprietorship, d/b/a The Bering Company Tank Division,"
was the proper sole defendant.
An insured party under an automobile liability policy has been
held to have sufficient notice of a suit against his insurance com-
pany, on a claim arising from an accident involving the insured, to
allow the plaintiff to substitute the insured as defendant in the suit.
In Angel v. Ray,7 the court seemed to rely principally upon the
insurance company's obligation to defend its insured and protect his
interests, in holding that the insured and insurance company had
the requisite "identity of interests" to satisfy Federal Rule 15(c).
Where plaintiffs have attempted to amend their pleadings to
add third party defendants to their own complaint as original party
defendants, the early tendency of courts was to deny relation back
treatment of the amendment if the statute of limitations had run
on the cause of action. In Horan v. Pope & Talbot, Inc.," the plain-
tiff sued Pope & Talbot, Inc., for injuries that he had sustained
while working on that defendant's vessel. Pope & Talbot, Inc., in
sharing of a majority of the officers and stockholders, an attempted substitution after the
statute had run was disallowed. The court held that service upon the named corporation's
secretary, who was neither an officer nor shareholder of the corporation sought to be substi-
tuted, was not sufficient to hold the latter corporation to notice of suit.
75. 382 F.2d 699 (10th Cir. 1967).
76. 285 F. Supp. 64 (E.D. Wis. 1968).
77. 119 F. Supp. 711 (E.D. Pa. 1953).
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turn brought in Chester Stevedoring Company and Jarka Corpora-
tion as third party defendants. After the statute of limitations had
run, the plaintiff attempted to amend his complaint to add those
third party defendants as original party defendants. The plaintiff's
motion for leave to amend was denied. The court reasoned that the
purpose of the federal rules was not to deny third party defendants
the defense of the statute of limitations and that plaintiff's request
to file an amended complaint on the third party defendant was
barred by the statute.78 A similar effort to amend the plaintiff's
claim so to assert a claim against a third party defendant also failed
in Hankinson v. Pennsylvania Railroad.79 Hankinson brought suit
against the railroad under the Federal Employer's Liability Act.
The defendant later joined the United States as a third party defen-
dant. After the limitations peribd had passed, plaintiff for the first
time tried to add the United States as a defendant in the original
action. The court disallowed the amendment in its brief disposition
of the case. "The amended complaint began the plaintiff's action
on his claim against the United States too late. It is of no avail to
the plaintiff that the railroad began its action on its claim against
the government in time.""0
In neither Horan nor Hankinson did the courts analyze the facts
as would now be required under federal rule 15(c); there was no
consideration whether the third party defendants had received no-
tice of the original complaint and knew that they would have been
made original parties if the plaintiffs had possessed full knowledge
of the facts. Perhaps the results would have been the same even
after such a consideration. But at least one federal district court has
thus extended its inquiry where a third party defendant was sought
to be made an original party defendant. In Meredith v. United Air
Lines,"' plaintiff's original claim, for personal injuries sustained
when the airplane on which she was a passenger made an abrupt
movement after a near-collision with another airplane allegedly op-
erated by the government, was asserted against United Air Lines
and the United States. After an investigation disclosed that Lock-
heed Aircraft Corporation may have been in control of the second
airplane, the United States brought in Lockheed as a third party
defendant, seeking indemnification if the government were held lia-
78. Id. at 712.
79. 160 F. Supp. 709 (E.D. Pa. 1958).
80. Id. at 710.
81. 41 F.R.D. 34 (S.D. Cal. 1966).
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ble. Lockheed was made a party to the investigation and was fully
informed of all the developments, including details of the instant
suit. When the plaintiff requested permission to add Lockheed as
an original party defendant afterthe statute had run, the court took
note of all those facts. The court concluded that the operative tests
of rule 15(c) had been met and that there was no reason to exclude
attempts to change the status of third party defendants from the
rule's coverage. Accordingly, the court allowed the amendment and
held it to relate back.82
Conscious attempts by plaintiffs to avoid the literal require-
ments of the rule for adding parties to a pending action have been
and will probably continue to be singularly unsuccessful. Plaintiffs
have frequently desired to build flexibility into their pleadings by
listing "John Does" in the caption as defendants, in the hope that
their ploy would allow later additions of particular individuals as
defendants in case new information came to light after the statute
of limitations had run. For example, in Bufalino v. Michigan Bell
Telephone Co.,8 the plaintiff brought a damage suit for illegal wire-
tapping against the Michigan Bell Telephone Company, two named
individuals, and "Does, One to Fifty, Inclusive." In his second
amended complaint, made after the statute of limitations had run,
the plaintiff named as additional defendants four Michigan Bell
Telephone employees, a private detective, and fourteen police offi-
cers of the City of Detroit, and reduced the number of John Does
from 50 to 31. The court dismissed this amendment and stated that
"action was never commenced as to the 'Does' because they were
not identified nor served with process. ' s4 Perhaps more important,
there was no showing of evidence that those individuals had either
notice or knowledge that they would have been made parties in the
absence of mistake by the plaintiff.
In Hoffman v. Halden,5 an action for the violation of civil rights
arising out of an alleged conspiracy resluting in the wrongful incar-
ceration of the plaintiff in the state hospital for the mentally ill, the
plaintiff originally filed the complaint against four named individu-
als and "John Doe" and "Richard Roe." None of the defendants
whom plaintiff sought to add by amendment had been named any-
where in the original complaint. In disallowing the amendment the
82. Id. at 39-41; See C. WRiGHT & A. MimR, note 4 supra, § 1498, at 513.
83. 404 F.2d 1023 (6th Cir. 1968).
84. Id. at 1028.
85. 268 F.2d 280 (9th Cir. 1959).
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court stated that there was no indication in the original complaint
that the true identities of John Doe and Richard Roe were unknown,
and that these defendants had not been given notice of the suit
before the statute of limitations had run.86
An allegation that the true identities of the John Does listed in
the caption were unknown was made in Philip v. Sam Finley, Inc. ,'87
but ultimately the allegation proved to be of little value. In Phillips
the complaint named as defendants, "Sam Finley, Inc., Adams
Construction Co., and John Doe, et al., whose exact identities were
unknown." 8 After the statute of limitations had run, the plaintiff
attempted to add three named defendants for the John Does. The
court disallowed the amendment, stating: "Plaintiff's use of the
fiction, John Doe, et al. did not create a new right to freely
amend. . . . Plaintiff cannot toll the running of the statute of limi-
tations by filing a complaint against some fictional character." 9
IV. CONCLUSION
As demonstrated by the above materials, the notice approach
to relation back of amendments to pleadings after the statute of
limitations has run is more liberal than the prior cause of action
approach. It should be expected that the Missouri courts will focus
more upon the basic factual situation underlying the claim than
upon the formal pleadings when deciding whether an amendment
will relate back. If the party has alleged sufficient factual material
to allow the defendant to prepare his defense, the amendment
should be allowed.
In the area of the addition of parties to the lawsuit, the courts
generally look to see whether the defendant should have known that
it was the intended defendant and what relationship it had with the
named defendant. The courts will look at the circumstances of the
case and determine whether the new defendant had notice of the
claim and is familiar with the basic factual situation underlying the
claim. If so, the courts will usually find that there will be no preju-
dice to the new defendant and therefore will allow the claim. As for
the addition of parties plaintiff, these should be allowed since the
defendant's defense would not be altered by the change in plaintiffs,
since the underlying factual situation remains the same.
SIDNEY G. MARLOW, JR.
86. Id. at 304.
87. 270 F. Supp. 292 (W.D. Va. 1967).
88. Id. at 293,
89. Id. at 294. See Craig v. United States, 413 F.2d 854 (9th Cir. 1969).
[Vol. 40
20
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 40, Iss. 3 [1975], Art. 4
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol40/iss3/4
